Saudi Arabia Transistions Leadership
February 5, 2026
The death of Saudi Arabian King Abdullah has prompted a number of glowing eulogies from fellow world leaders, somewhat contradicting the actual record of his reign. On the foreign policy front, Abdullah had close relations with the United States. However, his commitment to fighting terrorism seemed undermined by the House of Saud’s close connection with Wahhabism, the ultra-conservative form of Islam that forms the basis of the country’s laws. The two allies did not always agree: Abdullah wanted the US to attack Iran, and he attempted to stem the tide of the Arab Spring that swept the Middle East and North Africa.
Despite a reputation as a reformer, Abdullah’s enacted reforms were minimal; the biggest was most likely appointing the first female minister in the country’s history. But promises of reform (such as allowing women to drive) were mostly words, and he allegedly had some of his own daughters locked up for speaking out against his policies on women. Anti-terrorism laws, while successful in decimating al-Qaeda in the country, were also used to silence critics. Abdullah’s most substantial legacy is probably economic: he expanded education opportunities and encouraged foreign investment for the purpose of diversifying Saudi Arabia’s economy and reducing its reliance on oil exports.
Abdullah’s Successor Salman, his half-brother, is not expected to change much. He declared that he will continue with current policies and is not considered a reformer. During his almost 50-year tenure as governor of Riyadh, he earned a reputation as a good governor; part of the success with that job was due to his ability to mediate and settle matters within the sprawling royal family, an important task for the monarch of Saudi Arabia. He’s also not expected to be around for much longer – already 79, he’s rumored to have had a stroke and be suffering from dementia. The current next-in-line is his youngest brother, 69 year-old Muqrin, who is considered more of a reformer in the mold of Abdullah.
Since 1932, the head of the Al-Saud family has ruled the modern state of Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarch. The state is almost entirely controlled by the reigning king, who appoints all cabinet ministers and governors of the nation’s thirteen regions. Many governorships and cabinet positions are actually reserved for members of the family; only members of the Al Saud may hold positions such as Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, a member of the Al Saud typically commands the National Guard, a branch of the Saudi military not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. Each individual monarch’s power has varied, often depending upon opposition to a given monarch from other members of the royal family itself, but absolute power has remained within the hands of the Saudi family throughout the past eight decades.
Saudi law is based primarily upon royal decrees, which are technically subject to approval by the ulama, the Wahhabi religious scholars. Despite the supposed subordination of state law to Islamic law, the Al-Saud have historically exerted pressure on the religious establishment, often financial or rhetorical, to issue fatwa, or religious-legal opinions, in support of royal decrees. As the Al-Saud consolidated popular support through extravagant handouts to the public, funded by oil money, the support of the religious establishment decreased in political importance.
Despite calls for political modernization, including demands from intellectuals for increased political participation at all levels of society, especially for women, the Al-Saud family remains exceptionally strong. With an estimated net wealth of $1.4 trillion, and thousands of princes dependent on the largesse of the ruling cadre, the monarchy’s position is sound. At this point, religious leaders and the judiciary are almost entirely subordinate to the king. Political opposition is typically eliminated through a combination of brutal crackdowns and subsidies to the poor. King Salman ascended to a comfortable throne, certain in his near absolute power over the country.
Given the consensus-driven arrangement of the Saudi government, on the surface it does not appear that Abdullah’s successor will be looking to make any significant departures from his predecessor’s policies. In the realm of foreign policy, the broad strokes appear to be intact heading into Crown Prince Salman’s rule; maintaining close diplomatic ties to the United States, continuing to support the international coalition against IS and subverting Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria will remain priorities under the new leadership.
But beneath the surface there are signs that this leadership change could have meaningful implications on Saudi foreign policy relating to the United States and Iran, its closest ally and biggest regional competitor, respectively. Salman is expected to maintain high Saudi oil production despite the dramatic 60% fall in prices over the past six months, partially in order to hit US production and maintain Saudi market share. This move could exacerbate tensions between the world’s largest oil exporter and the world’s largest producer. Saudi Arabia has also taken a tougher stance on the Iranian nuclear program, which could be another potential sticking point during Obama’s final two years in office.
Perhaps more importantly, Saudi foreign policy in regards to Iran stands to change as tensions continue to rise between the two of the Middle East’s largest powers. In addition to the Iranian nuclear negotiations, the situation in Yemen is emerging as a focal point of tension, where Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have seized power from former president Hadi who was supported by both the United States and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has suspended its annual $2 billion aid to Yemen as the rebels have taken the capital region, financed heavily by the Iran which shares the Shi’a faith. As Yemen descends in political crisis, there is a Saudi fear that further political decentralization could be a boon for the expanding influence of Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
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Contributions by Alexi Stocker, Will Kirkland, and Wooyoung Lee